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A Queer Critique on the Polygamy Debate in Canada: 






On November 22, 2010, after years of growing concern and 
controversy, the Supreme Court of British Columbia opened the 
debate on the constitutional validity of the Criminal Code prohibition 
against polygamy. The reference case, arising out the failed 
prosecution of two prominent members of the Fundamentalist 
Mormon sect in Bountiful, British Columbia, has sparked a heated 
debate between academics, experts, and legal authorities on whether 
the prohibition should be struck down due to constitutional 
infringement or upheld because of the belief that polygamy is 
associated with gender inequality and the exploitation of women and 
children. Despite the large number of government officials, 
interveners, and experts weighing in on the issue of polygamy in 
Canada, overwhelmingly the focus in the case, and in academic 
literature generally, has been on religious and cultural forms of 
polygyny: the formal or informal marriage of a man with two or 
more wives. However, what is often ignored is that multi-partner 
conjugality comes in radically different forms, each with different 
personal and social effects. 
 
Polygamy is a general term that subsumes more specific forms and 
practices, such as polyandry, polygyny, and polyamory. Within the 
Canadian context, available evidence indicates that polygyny is the 
predominant form of polygamy practiced.1 In addition to emerging 
anecdotal evidence of its presence among some Canadian Muslim 
and Aboriginal groups, polygyny is well documented among 
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1 Lisa M Kelly, “Bringing International Human Rights Law Home: An Evaluation 
of Canada’s Family Law Treatment of Polygamy” (2007) 65 UT Fac L Rev 1 at 
para 8 (QL). 
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fundamentalist Mormons in British Columbia, and has become the 
focal point in the Supreme Court reference case. In Canada, there is 
little evidence of polyandry, where one woman has more than one 
husband.2 In the past few decades, however, evidence has gathered as 
to the growing number of polyamorous relationships that diverge 
from the traditional multiple partnerships of polygyny or polyandry.3 
Polyamorous arrangements “vary as to the number of people 
involved, the sexes of those involved, the sexualities of those 
involved, the level of commitment of those involved, and the kinds 
of relationships pursued.”4  The variance of these relationships both 
in terms of structure and egalitarian founding principles distinguishes 
them from the patriarchal norms traditionally associated with 
polygyny. In light of this distinction, scholars argue polyamory 
merits close attention in re-thinking monogamous paradigms, 
particularly in terms of coercive criminal polygamy laws and 
marriage law more generally.5 Despite the fact that polygyny 
continues to be the predominant form of multiple-partner unions in 
Canada, the traditional normative manner of viewing polygamy as 
gender-discriminatory and patriarchal ignores minority conceptions 
of sexual identity and intimate relationships. 
 
In Canada, non-monogamous patterns of intimacy continue to be 
ascribed the status of the “other”—of deviation and pathology—and 
in need of explanation, or alternatively are ignored, hidden, avoided 
and marginalized. This “mono-normative” perspective tends to 
universalize the exclusive, dyadic structure of the couple and 
elevates monogamy as the hegemonic norm.6  Marianne Pieper, who 
coined the term “mono-normativity”, argues that: 
 
the mono-normative matrix is a complex power relation, 
which (re)produces hierarchically arranged patterns of 
intimate relationships and devalues, marginalizes, 
excludes and ‘others’ those patterns of intimacy which 
do not correspond to the normative apparatus of the 
                                                
2 Ibid at para 9. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Maura Strassberg, “The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering 
Polyamory” (2003) 31 Cap U L Rev 439 at 440. 
5 Kelly, supra note 1 at para 9. 
6 Meg Barker & Darren Langridge, eds, Understanding Non-Monogamies (New 
York: Routledge, 2010) at 145 [Barker, “Understanding Non-Monogamies”]. 
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monogamous model. Mono-normativity is based on the 
taken for granted allegation that monogamy and couple-
shaped arranged relationships are the principle of social 
relationships per se, an essential foundation of human 
existence and the elementary, almost natural pattern of 
living together.7  
 
Laws which make it a criminal offence to practice polygamy,8 and 
which limit marriage to two individuals, reinforce certain hegemonic 
beliefs about sexual identity, intimate relationships, and the ideal 
family structure. Rooted in queer theory, this paper seeks to question 
the boundaries of monogamy and polygamy in Canada. By 
deconstructing monogamy, I will contest the belief that it is a natural, 
universal norm, and demonstrate that it is instead a socially 
constructed institution rooted in cultural supremacist, classist and 
sexist ideals. In rejecting the categorization of intimate relationships, 
this paper will highlight that marriage and intimate relationships can 
encompass a zone of positive and socially acceptable possibilities. 
Re-thinking and deconstructing monogamous paradigms may reveal 
polygamy as a legitimate way for individuals to exercise their 
autonomy, sexual preference, and expressions of love. 
 
This paper is divided into four parts. In Part I, I discuss how 
polygamy is regarded in Canada by reviewing the history and current 
treatment of polygamous unions both under criminal law and the law 
of marriage. By distinguishing between the various forms of non-
monogamies, I will reveal that it is a fallacy to automatically 
conclude that polygamy leads to sufficient social and personal harms 
to merit criminal sanction. In Part II, I attempt to deconstruct the 
institution of monogamous marriage and reveal its true socially 
constructed evolution. Despite marriage’s predominantly Christian 
and racist history, I will argue that formal marriage recognition 
remains symbolically significant in Canada and that, if the 
prohibition against polygamy is struck down, expanding the 
definition of marriage to include more than two people would be in 
accord with Canada’s recognition of diverse family forms and 
equality protections. In Part III, I propose a different way to look at 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 The term “polygamy” will be used throughout the paper to refer all forms of 
plural marriage or conjugal unions. 
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the monogamy versus polygamy debate though the lens of queer 
legal theory. Through queer theory, I will question the categorization 
of intimate relationships and reveal the difficulties of pursuing 
change through the Charter. Finally, in Part IV, I will make 
suggestions as to how the law can move towards a more pluralistic 
conception of personal relationships. 
Part I:  Polygamy In Canada 
 
1. The Current Debate Over the Constitutionality of Section 
293 of the Criminal Code 
 
Contrary to common Western assumptions, the majority of societies 
worldwide – about 83 percent – practice polygamy.9  In Canada and 
the US alone, it is estimated that approximately 30,000 to 100,000 
people are involved in some form of plural marriage.10 In recent 
decades, concerns over polygamy have grown for a number of 
reasons that reflect developments in other countries, as well as some 
developments that are more uniquely Canadian. The most publicized 
concern is the practice of polygamy by Fundamentalist Mormons in 
the area of Bountiful, British Columbia. While this group has been 
openly practicing polygamy in Canada for over 50 years, the issue 
has received attention only over the past two decades with former 
members of the community raising concerns about both the practice 
of polygamy and abuse within the community.11 Until recently, 
however, uncertainty about the constitutional validity of Canada’s 
laws prohibiting polygamy, and concerns about how to enforce the 
law have made authorities in British Columbia reluctant to act.12 
 
Finally, after long-standing allegations of abuse and corruption, in 
January 2009, Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints13 (FLDS) bishops, Winston Blackmore and James Oler, were 
                                                
9 Robert Leckey & Kim Brooks, eds, Queer Theory: Law, Culture, Empire (New 
York: Routledge, 2010) at 141. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Canada, Status of Women Canada, Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social 
Implications for Women and Children – A Collection of Policy Research (Ottawa: 
Status of Women Canada, 2005) at 3. 
12 Ibid at 1. 
13 The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is one of the 
largest Mormon fundamentalist denominations. 
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each charged with one count of polygamy.14 Those charges were 
subsequently dismissed on procedural grounds.15 Rather than 
appealing the decision, the Attorney General of British Columbia 
decided to bring a reference case in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia.16  The Court is being asked to determine if section 293 of 
the Criminal Code17—the provision prohibiting polygamy—is 
consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and 
to clarify how it should be interpreted. 
 
By and large, the anti-polygamy argument being brought by both 
federal and provincial attorney generals has presented polygamy as a 
patriarchal practice with inherent individual and social harms. This 
narrative includes stories of child brides, teen pregnancy, and 
expelled boys, and it relies heavily on evidence collected from the 
FLDS community in Bountiful, BC.18 The pro-polygamy argument, 
on the other hand, has relied on the fact that the enactment of the 
anti-polygamy law in 1892 was aimed at defending a Christian view 
of proper family life and was employed in the state’s cultural 
colonization of Aboriginal peoples.19 In constitutional terms, the 
amicus curiae has argued that the prohibition breaches the Charter 
guarantees of freedom of religion, association, equality (in terms of 
both religion and marital status) and liberty.20 
 
In his opening statement before the BC Supreme Court, the amicus 
curiae, George Macintosh, argued that section 293 is based on an 
assumption that polygamy is,  
 
a practice uniformly associated with harm; essentially, 
that it is ‘barbarous’. The law is based entirely on 
presumed, stereotypical characteristics, is not 
responsive to the actual characteristics of the particular 
                                                
14 Blackmore v British Columbia, 2009 BCSC 1299, [2010] 4 WWR 546. 
15Ibid. 
16 Reference re: Criminal Code of Canada (B.C.), 2011 BCSC 1588, [2011] BCJ 
No 2211. 
17 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 293(1). 
18 Reference Re Criminal Code, s 293 (1 November 2010) Vancouver S-097767 
(BC SC) (Opening Statement on Breach, Amicus Curiae) [Amicus Curiae]. 
19 Reference Re Criminal Code, s 293 (1 November 2010) Vancouver S-097767 
(BC SC) (Opening Statement on Breach, Canadian Polyamory Advocacy 
Association) [CPAA]. 
20 Amicus Curiae, supra note 18. 
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polygamous relationships, and has the effect of 
demeaning the dignity of practitioners of polygamy.21   
 
Allied with Macintosh on this sentiment is the Canadian Polyamory 
Advocacy Association (CPAA)—one of many interveners in the 
case. The gist of the CPAA’s argument is that the broad prohibition 
in section 293 captures all types of marriage or marriage-like 
relationships involving more than two people, encompassing the 
egalitarian multi-partner union known as conjugal polyamory. 
 
In its Opening Statement on Breach, the CPAA points out that our 
society’s bias towards monogamy is merely the result of social 
traditions that are passed on from generation to generation.22 It 
should not be mistakenly assumed that the nineteenth century 
position on polygamy was about gender equality. Instead, the 
racialized and politicized roots of the polygamy doctrine in both the 
United States and Canada give pause to assertions that the law is 
both valid and important in protecting individual freedoms and 
democracy.  
 
2. History of the Treatment of Polygamy in Canada Under the 
Law 
 
Polygamy has been illegal in Canada since 1892. The original 
polygamy prohibition was enacted as part of the first Criminal 
Code23, with the intent of discouraging immigration by polygamous 
American Mormon families, who at that time were being actively 
prosecuted by the United States government.24 The law’s politicized 
roots are revealed in the wording of the original statute, which 
included a specific reference and prohibition on “Mormon” 
polygamous marriages, as well as other polygamous relationships. 
The target clause was not removed from the Criminal Code until 
1954.25 The present provision in the Criminal Code, section 293, 
prohibits not only participation in a polygamous marriage ceremony, 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 CPAA, supra note 19.  
23 Criminal Code, SC 1892, c 29, ss 278, 706. 
24 Nicholas Bala, “Why Canada’s Prohibition of Polygamy is Constitutionally 
Valid and Sound Social Policy” (2009) 25 Can J Fam L 165 at para 26 (QL) [Bala, 
“Constitutionally Valid”]. 
25 Criminal Code, SC 1953-54, c 51, s 243. 
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but also makes it an offence to enter into “any form of polygamy” or 
live in “any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the 
same time.” 
 
Since 1892, there have only been a handful of prosecutions under the 
Code’s polygamy sections, most of which involved Aboriginal 
men.26 One of the most notable of these was R v Bear’s Shin Bone, 
the 1899 case of a Blood Indian from the North West Territories, 
Bear’s Shin Bone, who was convicted under the polygamy section 
for entering into simultaneous conjugal unions with two women.27 
Susan G. Drummond asserts that the use of the law to forcefully 
restructure Aboriginal families suggests that, in addition to its 
racialized and politicized American roots, it was also implemented as 
an instrument of colonization.28 Prior to the recent Bountiful 
prosecution, the last reported attempt at using this provision was in 
1937, when it was held by the Ontario Court of Appeal that a man 
who left his wife and was living in an adulterous relationship was not 
committing the offence of polygamy.29 
 
Similar to the treatment of polygamy under the criminal law, 
Canada’s family law restriction of marriage to two people can also 
be traced back to the nineteenth century. The definition of marriage 
accepted by the courts until the Marriage Reference30 was adopted 
from an English decision in 1866. Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee 
involved a potentially polygamous marriage in which an Englishman 
had married a Mormon woman in Utah.31 Lord Penzance, striving to 
exclude such a marriage from receiving the same treatment as a 
traditional monogamous one, stated: “marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union 
... of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.”32 This 
explicitly Christian definition of marriage prevailed in Canada from 
1866 to 2005, wherein the Civil Marriage Act changed the definition 
                                                
26 Bala, “Constitutionally Valid”, supra note 24 at para 27. 
27 R v Bear’s Shin Bone (1899), 4 Terr LR 173, 3 CCC 329 (NWT CA). 
28 Susan G Drummond, “Polygamy’s Inscrutable Criminal Mischief” (2009) 47 
Osgoode Hall LJ 317 at para 31 (QL). 
29 R v Tolhurst and Wright, [1937] 3 DLR 808, 68 CCC 319 (Ont CA) [Tolhurst]. 
30 Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698 [Marriage 
Reference]. 
31 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866), LR 1 P & D 130 (Prob & Div). 
32 Ibid at 133. 
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to “the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others,” 
while continuing to prohibit plural unions from civil marriages.33 
 
3. Distinguishing Between the Various Forms of Non-
Monogamies 
 
In order to fully understand the draconian nature of the criminal 
law’s treatment towards polygamy, it is important to distinguish 
between the various forms of non-monogamous relationships and to 
question their moral and criminal status within Canada. To limit the 
distinction in this paper to “monogamy” and “polygamy” would be 
to oversimplify the diverse range of both monogamous and non-
monogamous relationships. Indeed, the range of labels and categories 
Western societies impose on the variety of intimate relationships 
makes one question whether the distinction between monogamy and 
non-monogamy is even useful or meaningful. 
 
The traditional conception of monogamy refers to a form of marriage 
in which an individual has only one spouse at any one time. 
Monogamy may also refer to the more general state of having one 
mate at any one time to the exclusion of all others. Despite this 
generally accepted ideal, current research within the fields of 
sociology and psychology has shown that these so-called 
relationships are generally monogamous in name rather than deed, 
with non-consensual non-monogamy being a more common mode of 
relating.34 Even within truly exclusive relationships, there is a 
variation between life-long relationships and serial monogamy. With 
our staggering rates of divorce and our culture’s high valuation on 
choice and individuality, life-time commitments are increasingly 
seen as a thing of the past with serial monogamy—characterized by a 
series of long- or short-term, exclusive sexual relationships—taking 
its place as the “norm”. 
 
In addition to non-consensual non-monogamy (generally referred to 
as adultery or infidelity), there is a range of consensual non-
monogamous relationships: open relationships, swinging, and 
                                                
33 Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33, s 2. 
34 Meg Barker & Darren Langridge, “Whatever happened to non-monogamies? 
Critical reflections on recent research and theory” (2010) 13 Sexualities 748 at 753 
[Barker, “Critical Reflections”].  
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polyamory being the forms most studied to date.35 Broadly speaking, 
polyamory involves having multiple relationships which may be 
emotionally close and/or sexual in nature, whereas “swinging” 
(spouse-swapping) and open relationships involve couples openly 
having sexual (but generally not emotionally close) relationships 
with other people—either separately or as a couple.36 Even within 
polyamory, there is a diverse range of relationship structures and 
networks with varying sexual orientations, genders and numbers 
involved. 
 
Due to the broad wording of section 293, conjugal polyamory—
where three or more parties in a polyamorous relationship all live in 
the same household—falls squarely within the polygamy prohibition 
under the Criminal Code. Despite the argument that this egalitarian, 
emotionally grounded relationship structure is considered a criminal 
offence, short of constituting “acts of indecency”, other forms of 
consensual and non-consensual non-monogamous relationships are 
perfectly legal. The Criminal Code does not make adultery an 
offence, and as was laid down in R v Tolhurst and Wright, sex with 
one partner while being married to another, whether or not 
consensual, does not constitute polygamy.37 
 
Further, recent case law has held that swinging practices, short of 
causing harm, are not indecent acts for the purpose of the Criminal 
Code. In the 1982 case of R v Mason, an Ontario court held that 
swinging parties, in a private non-commercial setting, do not 
constitute indecent acts.38 Husbands and wives (common law and 
civilly married) can freely invite other sexual partners into their 
homes for the pleasure of casual sex. In addition to swinging in 
private homes, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, swinging 
and group sex are also acceptable in bars. In the 2005 case of R v 
Labaye, the accused operated a club in Montreal that permitted 
couples (both married and not) and single people to meet each other 
for group sex.39 Labaye was charged with keeping a common bawdy-
house under section 210(1) of the Criminal Code. In acquitting the 
accused, the majority of the Court made it clear that the Crown had 
                                                
35 Ibid at 750. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Tolhurst, supra note 17. 
38 R v Mason (1981), 6 WCB 112, 59 CCC (2d) 461 (Ont Prov Ct (Crim Div)). 
39 R v Labaye, 2005 SCC 80, [2005] 3 SCR 728 [Labaye]. 
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failed to establish that any harm had been committed. The threshold 
to establish harm was set by determining whether the conduct 
confronts the public with behaviour that interferes with their 
autonomy and liberty, pre-disposes others to anti-social behaviour, or 
physically or psychologically harms the people involved in the 
conduct.40 The harm also needs to be incompatible with the proper 
functioning of society. In the case of swinging, in so far as the 
activity was taking place in a private setting, the threshold of harm 
was not met. 
 
Clearly, neither the Canadian courts nor Parliament have problems 
with adults privately engaging in adultery, swinging or group sex. 
Indeed, with the importance Canada places on liberty, autonomy and 
diversity, it is no wonder that Canada would be slow to restrict 
private sexual activity. Rather, it appears to be the point at which the 
relationship with each sexual partner becomes spouse-like that the 
criminal law steps in. It is the identification of “conjugal unions” in 
section 293 that captures marriage-like polygamous relationships 
within the section. While casual sex within or outside of a marriage 
is freely permitted, our law takes issue with concurrent multiple 
relationships that appear marriage-like in nature. Considering this 
seemingly arbitrary approach, one must ask, what is so special about 
marriage to justify criminal sanction against these polygamous 
unions? 
 
Part II:  The Institution of Monogamous Marriage 
 
In Canada, marriage is an exclusive and categorically fixed 
institution. If we are to expand the notion of marriage through queer 
theory, an important first step is to question and deconstruct this 
dominant norm. Therefore, this next section will question the 
importance of the institution of marriage itself and ask why it is 
limited to two individuals in Western culture. 
 
1. Why is Marriage Limited to Monogamous Couples? 
 
Political, popular and psychological discourses tend to present 
monogamous coupledom as the only natural and/or morally correct 
form of human relating. Contrary to the dominant assumption of 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
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monogamous marriage as a natural institution, numerous scholars 
have demonstrated the historical and culturally situated nature of 
monogamy. The monogamy bias (or mono-normativity) perpetuates 
the idea that the maximum number of sexual relationships that is 
acceptable for any person to engage in at the same time is one.41 
Critiques of this mono-normative view have taken various forms. 
Some simply focus on the socially constructed history of monogamy, 
whereas others point to monogamy’s religious, political and 
racialized roots. In general, as was stated by the CPAA in its opening 
statement, “[t]he monogamy bias, like the heterosexual and racial 
bias, is the result of social traditions that are passed on from 
generation to generation and have nothing but the weight of the past 
to support them.”42 
 
First, much literature emphasizing the diversity of relationship forms 
counters evolutionary and biological essentialist arguments of 
“natural monogamy” by using statistics on the rarity of pair-bonding 
amongst animals (only a few dozen out of four thousand mammal 
species), and within human cultures.43 George Murdock’s famous 
cross-cultural analysis, Ethnographic Atlas, revealed that 195 of 250 
societies preferred plural forms of marriage, though monogamy was 
universally practiced due to gender ratios and economic barriers.44  
Moreover, reducing monogamy to an innate or natural practice can 
be viewed as another in a long line of similar arguments, all now 
discredited, by which anti-democratic law makers have tried to block 
social change. Consider that for over one hundred years homosexual 
conduct was criminalized in Canada, and for years after those laws 
were repealed homosexuals were denied rights that heterosexuals 
enjoyed. A commonly given reason for such discrimination was that 
homosexuality is contrary to nature.45 
 
More explicitly, social constructionist authors have written about 
recent transformations in Western identities and intimacies, which 
have greatly altered the ways in which people understand and 
                                                
41 Barker, “Understanding Non-Monogamies”, supra note 6. 
42 CPAA, supra note 19 at para 25. 
43 Barker, “Critical Reflections”, supra note 34 at 752. 
44 Jamie R Wood, “Moving Beyond the Bedrooms of our Nation: Redefining 
Canadian Families From the Perspective of Non-Conjugal Caregiving” (2008) 13 
Appeal 7 at para 13 (QL).  
45 CPAA, supra note 19 at paras 56-60.  
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experience their relationships.46 The social constructionist approach 
to sexuality is grounded in the belief that our identity, desires, 
relationships and emotions are shaped by the culture in which we 
live.47 As perpetuated through media representations, the dominant 
version of relationships available in Western culture is of life-long or 
serial monogamy with “the one” perfect partner. Mainstream media 
are saturated with depictions of such romantic love relationships: 
people finding “Mr/Miss Right” and staying “together forever”. In 
contrast, polygamous relationships are represented in the media 
through shows such as Big Love48 and the media frenzy surrounding 
Bountiful, BC, as patriarchal, gender discriminatory, and “cult-like”.  
These representations serve social functions, maintaining monogamy 
in a position of hegemonic dominance.49 
 
The ability of our culture to shape and perpetuate the monogamy bias 
is by no means a natural social evolution. Rather, many scholars 
argue that it is a consequence of calculated state objectives rooted in 
cultural supremacist, classist and sexist ideals.50 Sarah Carter, in her 
recent book, The Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and 
Nation Building in Western Canada to 1915, argues that Canadian 
land settlement policies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries constructed an ideal of marriage that was used as a vehicle 
for the domestication of Western Canada by white Christian families. 
This nuptial model was one characterized as monogamous, 
heterosexual, intra-racial, male dominated and self-sufficient.51 Land 
policies were designed to marginalize and exclude communities who 
did not adhere to this spousal idea. What mattered most was the 
peaceful and prosperous settlement of the West, and any distractions 
from this (whether from the fluid, indulgent and cavalier nature of 
                                                
46 Ani Ritchie & Meg Barker, “‘There Aren’t Words for What We Do or How We 
Feel So We Have To Make Them Up’: Constructing Polyamorous Languages in a 
Culture of Compulsory Monogamy” (2006) 9:5 Sexualities 584 [Ritchie, 
“Constructing Polyamorous Languages”]. 
47 Ibid at 585. 
48 Big Love, 2006, Television Show: (New York, NY: HBO, 2006). 
49 Ritchie, “Constructing Polyamorous Languages”, supra note 46 at 588. 
50 Sarah Carter, The Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and Nation 
Building in Western Canada to 1915 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
2008). 
51 Ibid. 
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customary aboriginal marriage or other) were to be muted or 
eliminated.52 
 
Like Sarah Carter’s analysis of Canadian settlement policies, other 
political critiques of mono-normativity follow from the ways in 
which it can be located in a specific cultural and historical moment. 
Indeed, compulsory monogamy has been tied to contemporary 
consumer capitalism and notions of ownership, patriarchal religion, 
race and class, and gender and compulsory heterosexuality.53 Victoria 
Robinson sums up the key political arguments in her statement that 
monogamy, “privileges the interests of both men and capitalism, 
operating as it does through the mechanisms of exclusivity, 
possessiveness and jealousy, all filtered through the rose-tinted lens 
of romance.”54 Others argue that current forms of monogamy came 
into being historically because of the need for women to care for the 
current and future workforce without being paid.55 Nancy Cott, in her 
history of public regulation of marriage, asserts that marriage has 
been a tool of “cultural regulation” and is the vehicle by which the 
state transforms the public order into a “gendered order.”56 Moreover, 
numerous scholars agree that marriage law in general has been a site 
for the production of normative citizenship and a key mechanism by 
which Western governments can produce a heterosexual, gendered, 
and racialized citizenry.57 
 
The racial and religious hierarchies of white supremacy and 
Christian hegemony are thought to have been fundamental to the 
processes of distinction that mark polygamy’s social and political 
intolerability.58 Margaret Denike argues that, 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Barker, “Understanding Non-Monogamies”, supra note 6 at 257.  
54 Victoria Robinson, “My Baby Just Cares for Me: Feminism, heterosexuality and 
non-monogamy” (1997) 6:4 Journal of Gender Studies 143 at 144. 
55 M Munson & JP Stelboum, The Lesbian Polyamory Reader: Open 
Relationships, Non-Monogamy, and Casual Sex (New York: Haworth Press, 
1999). 
56 Nancy F Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
57 Jaime M Gher, “Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage – Allies or Adversaries 
Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement” (2008) 14 Wm & Mary J Women & L 
559 at 565.  
58 Margaret Denike, “The Racialization of White Man’s Polygamy” (2010) 25:4 
Hypatia 852 at 857. 




the preoccupation with polygamy in the late nineteenth 
century was both fuelled and exacerbated by the ‘racial 
Anglo-Saxonism’ of the emergent nation in the face of 
racial and cultural heterogeneity, at a time of post civil-
war anxiety about the naturalness of America’s racial 
and political destiny as a white Christian nation.59 
 
She describes how genealogical analyses reveal the deep fears and 
profound sensitivities around the origins, allegiances, and 
distinctions of blood during this era.60 Moreover, the efforts by the 
dominant class to legitimize, institutionalize, and naturalize a 
Christian sexual morality of (white) heterosexual monogamy, and to 
delegitimize any other familial or intimate relational configuration, 
especially when associated with a different religious doctrine, further 
stigmatized individuals engaged in polygamous relationships.61 
 
As can be surmised from the discussion above, most critiques of 
mono-normativity point to the explicitly Christian foundation of 
monogamous marriage. In most ancient societies, rules and laws 
about marriage were intertwined with religious texts, beliefs, and 
practices.62 For example, the legal prohibitions in the English 
common law on marriage to blood relatives and in-laws (rules about 
consanguinity and affinity) were based on the Old Testament of the 
Bible.63 While the Old Testament accepts polygamy without critical 
comment, the New Testament, on the other hand, recognizes the 
special nature of marriage and the importance of marital love.64 
Although polygamy is not condemned in the New Testament, major 
Christian faiths determined that marriage is to be monogamous.65  
Indeed, as was stated above, the common law definition of marriage 
as the “voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the 
exclusion of all others” accepted in Canada until 2005, was 
                                                
59 Ibid at 855. 
60 Ibid at 853. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Bala, “Constitutionally Valid”, supra note 24 at para 7. 
63 Leviticus 18 and 20, as interpreted in Roman Catholic canonical law at the 
Council of Trent (1563) and Archbishop Parker's Table in Church of England's 
Book of Common Prayer. 
64 Bala, “Constitutionally Valid”, supra note 24 at para 9. 
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unapologetically based on a religious, and explicitly Christian, view 
of marriage.66 
 
It would be difficult and erroneous to point to one particular reason 
why marriage in Canada is limited to two people. Whatever the 
cultural and political reasons were for separating monogamy and 
polygamy under the law, it is clear that along the way a dichotomy 
was created in which “monogamy” was seen as good (Christian, 
gender-equal, law abiding, family oriented) and “polygamy” as bad 
(dangerous, promiscuous, non-white, hedonistic, unchristian).  
Marriage itself has been viewed by some as simply an archaic 
institution used to perpetuate the dominant hegemonic ideals. 
However, regardless of marriage’s predominantly Christian and 
politically charged past, the next section will explain why formal 
marriage recognition remains symbolically significant in Canada and 
how the expansion of marriage to include polygamy would be in 
accord with Canada’s increasing acceptance of a diverse range of 
relationships. 
 
2. Why is Marriage Important? Why Expand It At All? 
 
“Marriage is one of the great mediators of individuality 
and community, revelation and reason, tradition and 
modernity. Marriage is at once a harbor of the self and a 
harbinger of the community, a symbol of divine love and 
a structure of reasoned consent, an enduring ancient 
mystery and a constantly modern invention.”67 
 
John Witte Jr. 
 
Leading up to the lengthy campaigns for same-sex marriage, many 
may be surprised to learn that many gays and lesbians actually 
opposed the fight for same-sex marriage.68 Opponents expressed 
concerns over the dangers of assimilation, of losing both a unique 
                                                
66 Ibid at para 10. 
67 John Witte Jr, “An Apt and Cheerful Conversation on Marriage” in Steven M 
Tipton & John Witte Jr, eds, The Family Transformed: Religion, Values and the 
Family in Modern America (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006) 
at 1. 
68 Christine Davies, “Canadian Same-Sex Marriage Litigation: Individual Rights, 
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culture and the sense of solidarity and identity that came with 
membership in that community.69 While organizations like the 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights in Ontario argued that same-
sex couples should receive the same legal recognition and incur the 
same obligations as heterosexual couples, others argued that same-
sex relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual 
relationships.70 After years of strategy and progress with other rights, 
the LGBT (“Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender”) community 
perspective eventually came to be that while not everyone desired 
marriage, some did, and the community would rally behind and 
support their freedom.71 Laurie Arron, the National Coordinator of 
Canadians for Equal Marriage, noted that opponents had, over the 
years, stepped up a pre-emptive fight against gay rights and in 
particular, gay marriage, which they saw as the ultimate threat.72 The 
casting of marriage as a threat by conservative opponents, Arron 
argued, drew the LGBT community together, and they came to see 
marriage as symbolic of their larger struggle.73 The marriage fight 
thus became symbolic of dignity, freedom, equality and full 
participation for a diverse coalition of LGBT people.74 
 
Although the fight towards formal polygamous marriage recognition 
may still be a ways away, in order to understand the full manner in 
which the law in Canada has ostracized polygamous relationships, it 
is important to address the significance of marriage within our 
culture. In addition to the treatment of these relationships under the 
criminal law, denying polygamous relationships the right to enter 
into legal marriage only further marginalizes these groups and 
perpetuates the mono-normative idea that monogamy and couple-
shaped arrangements are the only valid and acceptable relationship 
form. Indeed, the language of marriage continues to hold great 
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70 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Rights and Responsibilities of 
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71 Davies, supra note 68 at para 9. 
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symbolic and institutional meaning in Canada.75 As the same-sex 
marriage campaign illustrates, beyond its functional implications in 
ascribing immediate benefits and obligations, marriage recognition 
plays a significant culturally constitutive role. 
 
During the lengthy legal battle towards same-sex marriage 
recognition, several courts commented at numerous times on the 
importance of the right to marry. In Halpern v Canada (Attorney 
General) the Court of Appeal for Ontario noted: 
 
Marriage is ... one of the most significant forms of 
personal relationships. For centuries, marriage has been a 
basic element of social organization in societies around 
the world. Through the institution of marriage, 
individuals can publicly express their love and 
commitment to each other. Through this institution, 
society publicly recognizes expressions of love and 
commitment between individuals, granting them respect 
and legitimacy as a couple. This public recognition and 
sanction of marital relationships reflect society’s 
approbation of the personal hopes, desires and 
aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal 
relationships. This can only enhance an individual’s 
sense of self-worth and dignity.76 
 
As the court noted in Halpern, marriage recognition involves much 
more than an argument for equal access to “economic benefits.”77 
Both inside and outside the courts, many have noted the symbolic 
importance that the language of marriage provides. For example, 
Evan Wolfson argues that “language defines possibility and place, 
and marriage is part of the vocabulary of commitment and family. 
We have to use the same language so that everyone else will 
understand.”78 This idea of the messaging or expressive function of 
law speaks to the idea of law playing a greater role than simply 
ordering society and solving disputes.79 For James Boyd White, “law 
                                                
75 Kelly, supra note 1 at 50. 
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77 Ibid at para 94. 
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acts rhetorically in establishing, maintaining, and transforming 
community and culture,” something he refers to as “constitutive 
rhetoric.”80 
 
If one views the law through the constitutive lens that White urges us 
to, giving marriage rights to non-monogamous relationships may 
help break the mono-normative hold. With the enactment in 1982 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the inclusion of 
same-sex couples in the definition of marriage under the Civil 
Marriage Act, Canada is increasingly moving towards greater 
recognition of diverse family forms. At one time there was a broad 
social and legal consensus about who was a “spouse”, what was 
“marriage”, and what was a “family”, but these concepts have 
increasingly been subject to social, legal and political challenge.81 
The law no longer defines the family exclusively in terms of 
heterosexual marriage, but now corresponds more closely to the 
functional and pluralistic reality of intimate adult relationships in 
Canada. Thus, a future move towards formal recognition of 
polygamous marriage would not only help break the monogamy bias 
but also would be a natural next step in Canada’s move towards 
recognizing diversity and providing equality, autonomy and liberty 
for all. 
 
Of course, it may be argued by some that entry into a traditionally 
heterosexual, couple-based institution would risk assimilation and 
the loss of unique polygamous cultures. However, as was seen in the 
LGBT fight for equal rights, the freedom to choose has the symbolic 
power to elevate the status of polygamy in society as a legitimate, 
socially acceptable form of expressing one’s love. Further, as will be 
discussed below, if marriage law in Canada is able to move away 
from a categorical, exclusion based approach and more towards a 
pluralistic conception of marriage, where entry would no longer be 
limited to particular identity categories, individuals would be able to 
choose for themselves what form their marriage will take and how 
their needs for sexual and emotional intimacy, material support, 
reproduction and childrearing are to be met. 
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Part III:  A Queer Critique on the Polygamy Debate 
 
1. A Queer Conception of Intimate Relationships 
 
The academic discourse known as queer theory emerged during the 
1980s and 1990s as a critique of both feminist and gay and lesbian 
theories at that time.82 In response to the constellation of issues 
around sexuality and discrimination, gay and lesbian politics tended 
to naturalize binary sexual identities and adopted a formal equality 
model that sought to equate the moral value and political status of 
homosexuality and heterosexuality.83 It is in this context that queer 
theorists developed their skepticism of the identity-based nature of 
feminist and gay legal theories. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick applied this 
criticism in terms of the hetero/homo divide. She developed her 
queer theory based on the rejection of the constrained binary of 
heterosexual/homosexual and sought to understand sexuality as more 
fluid. She recognized a multiplicity of sexual possibilities rather than 
a hierarchy in which the heterosexual presides over the 
homosexual.84 Like Sedgwick, many queer theorists blur the rigid 
line typically drawn between heterosexual and homosexual and seek 
to radically pluralize sexed and gendered practices.85 
 
The exact parameters of queer theory are difficult to determine. 
Central to the project though is the contestation of boundaries and 
categories, not only of sexual identity, but more widely to include the 
boundaries of normalcy itself.86 If it has a core, queer theory is about 
resisting categorization: it has been described as a “zone of 
possibilities in which the embodiment of the subject might be 
experienced otherwise.”87 Moreover, queer theorists constantly seek 
to reflect upon the contingency and ambiguity of all sexual 
categories. Rather than constituting an identity category itself, queer 
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theory highlights the contingency of all boundaries of social practice 
and identity, including its own.88 
 
It is in this context that this paper seeks to question the boundaries 
and identity categories of intimate relationships—monogamy and 
polygamy in particular. This section develops a queer analytic for the 
study of personal relationships in the twenty-first century, which is 
grounded in an appreciation of the variety of ways in which people 
live their lives outside of the mono-norm. The mono-normative 
perspective, developed through political, racial, and religious ideals 
and perpetuated through cultural representations, has valorized the 
relatively narrow, categorical approach to marriage and intimate 
relationships. As was articulated above, monogamy as a hegemonic 
norm is based on the assumption that couple-shaped relationships are 
the only valid, morally acceptable form of conjugal union. From this 
perspective, non-monogamies continue to be demonized, avoided, 
and denied the legal rights available to monogamous couples. 
 
If we are able to step away from the idea that monogamy is the only 
valid way of relating, we can begin to appreciate the plurality of 
sexual practices and identities. In viewing the monogamy/polygamy 
divide through a queer lens, we must be cautious to not describe our 
goal as the attainment of formal equality. By ascribing polygamy the 
status of a sexual minority, we would merely be perpetuating the idea 
that relationships are hierarchical, with monogamy retaining its 
status as the ideal. This approach would continue to situate 
monogamy as the corner stone of marriage, while other relationships 
would merely be provided the opportunity to achieve the same status. 
Instead of limiting intimate relationships to monogamy versus 
polygamy, by looking at relationships and sexual practices along a 
continuum of variation, we might be able to develop a discourse 
wherein all types of intimacies are respected and treated as equal. 
 
Gayle Rubin in her article, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical 
Theory of the Politics of Sexuality”, commented on how most 
systems of thought about sex attempt to conform sexuality to a single 
standard.89 She argues: 
                                                
88 Stychin, supra note 86 at para 23.  
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variation is a fundamental property of all life, from the simplest 
biological organisms to the most complex human social 
formations. Yet sexuality is supposed to conform to a single 
standard. One of the most tenacious ideas about sex is that 
there is one best way to do it, and that everyone should do it 
that way.90  
  
It would be quite objectionable to insist that everyone be 
heterosexual, married, or conventional. So why do we believe that all 
relationships should be monogamous? 
 
In collapsing the boundaries of sexuality, exposing relationships as 
fluid, and in pluralizing sexed and gendered practices, the queering 
of the monogamy/polygamy divide can encompass a greater range of 
constituents and open up a legitimate range of sexual, gendered, and 
relational possibilities. The idea that sexual and relational categories 
are stable and mutually exclusive has been identified as a specifically 
modern Western phenomenon.91 Exposing the constructedness of the 
monogamy/polygamy boundary will hopefully provide opportunities 
for further resistance of mono-normativity. 
 
2. The Queer Resistance of Marriage 
 
Despite the arguments laid out above—namely, that marriage is an 
important institution that, if expanded, can provide a vehicle in 
which non-monogamous forms of intimate relationships can achieve 
respect and recognition—some queer scholars argue that, by seeking 
marriage rights, sexual minorities misguidedly try to legitimatize 
their sexualities through an oppressively monogamous, proprietary, 
shame-based institution that forbids constructions of freer sexuality.92 
Michael Warner, in his book Trouble with Normal, argues, “even 
though people think that marriage gives them validation, legitimacy, 
and recognition, they somehow think that it does so without 
invalidating, delegitimating, or stigmatizing other relations, needs, 
and desires.”93 Indeed, if we are to deconstruct the 
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monogamy/polygamy divide through the lens of queer theory and 
argue for the expansion of marriage, it is important to address the 
inherent normativity of marriage itself. 
 
A conception of activism as enlarging the life options of individuals 
in all relationship forms has manifest appeal. However, this way of 
thinking says nothing about whether pursuing legal marriage is a 
good political strategy, about the ethical questions of what marrying 
does, about state regulation, or about the normativity of marriage.  
Warner sums up the queer arguments against the pursuit of marriage 
by describing it as a social system of both permission and restriction: 
 
Marriage sanctifies some couples at the expense of 
others. It is selective legitimacy. This is a necessary 
implication of the institution ... To a couple that gets 
married, marriage just looks ennobling ... Stand outside it 
for a second and you see the implication: if you don’t 
have it, you and your relations are less worthy. Without 
this corollary effect, marriage would not be able to 
endow anybody’s life with significance. The ennobling 
and the demeaning go together. Marriage does one only 
by virtue of the other. Marriage, in short, discriminates.94  
 
In addition to the exclusionary effect of marriage, in the modern era, 
marriage has become the central legitimating institution by which the 
state regulates and permeates people’s most intimate lives.95 The 
consequences of marriage are tied to privileges and prohibitions, 
incentives and disincentives, as well as the state regulation of 
sexuality. According to queer theory, each of these should be 
challenged, not celebrated, as a condition of the right to marry.96 
According to Warner, as long as people marry, the state will continue 
to regulate the sexual lives of those who do not marry: 
 
[The state] will continue to refuse to recognize our intimate 
relations—including cohabiting partnerships—as having the 
same rights or validity as a married couple. It will criminalize 
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our consensual sex. It will stipulate at what age and in what 
kind of space we can have sex.97   
 
In sum, as long as there is marriage, the state will continue to accord 
legitimacy to some kinds of consensual sex but not to others, or to 
confer respectability on some people’s sexuality but not on others. It 
is within this normalizing effect that queer theorists have rejected the 
strategy of pursuing legal marriage. 
 
Despite these arguments against the pursuit of legal marriage, it is 
important to keep in mind the symbolic effect of legal marriage and 
the status conferred informally by marriage. It must be made clear 
that in arguing for the retention of marriage, this paper is not 
intending to make the case for marriage. Indeed, marriage’s 
discriminatory and exclusionary effects cannot be ignored. Instead, 
this paper is simply calling for the questioning of the conception and 
boundaries of marriage. In expanding marriage to include a variety 
of relationship forms, it could be seen as one step towards a larger 
goal, in which the legitimacy of state regulation over people’s 
intimate lives and the categorization of relationships could be 
confronted and challenged rather than simply ignored. 
 
3. The Categorical Foundation of the Common Law 
 
Although examining the polygamy/monogamy divide through queer 
theory has the potential to empower the oppressed and disrupt the 
hegemonic hold over monogamy, it is important to address salient 
arguments against the pursuit of change through this discourse. 
Namely, it is important to consider that protections and benefits can 
only be achieved through categorization and that categorical thought 
is the foundation of the common law method of analysis, which 
makes it impossible to conceive of a legal process to address 
relationships without assigning categories. Although broader 
arguments have been made against the legalization of polygamy, 
including its associated individual and social harms, this section will 
only deal with arguments that could be made against the liberation of 
relationships through a queer analysis. 
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First, some may adopt the view provided by Tim Edwards in his 
critique of queer theory and politics and argue that the celebration of 
diversity would only lead to individualism and fragmentation.98 
Edwards argues that marginalized groups should stick together rather 
than focusing on differences.99 Although the success of minority 
movements in advancing equality cannot be ignored, in a plural 
country, where individual identities cannot be reduced to notions of 
only gender or sexuality, limiting political action to categorical 
groups has the effect of excluding individuals who either cannot fit 
their identity into a particular group or who consider their identity to 
include complex or varying dimensions. Limiting a political 
movement to polyamory, for example, while excluding other forms 
of non-monogamies would be similar to limiting the queer 
movement to homosexuals, while excluding others who might more 
accurately identify themselves as bisexual, transgendered, or 
transsexual. Not only would this exclude a diversity of sexual or 
gender identities from social, political, and legal recognition, but 
would propagate the notion that some sexual identities are superior to 
others. Therefore, in speaking about non-monogamies, it is 
imperative that we resist the categorization or “normalization” of 
intimate relationships when moving towards political action and 
legal change. 
 
Further, some might wonder how it would be possible to bring such 
language and politics to bear in legal discourse, when legal discourse 
is built upon categories. Some queer theorists, such as Carl Stychin, 
suggest that legal strategies might ultimately demand some sort of 
essentialism or use of identity categories, given that categorical 
thought is the foundation of the common law method of analysis.100 
Strategic essentialism, coined by Cayatri Chakravorty Spivak, is the 
move away from essentialism as a negative practice and towards 
essentialism as a means to resist essentialism.101 It is the choice to 
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develop an essentialized community, discrete minority or general 
category, such as “woman” or “queer,” for the purpose of advancing 
specific political goals. Postmodern feminists and queer theorists 
turn to strategic essentialism as a means to empower previously 
subordinated groups through self-definition, as opposed to being 
defined by those who would oppose them.102 The deconstructive and 
yet politically effective nature of this strategy is derived from the 
acknowledgement that the essential attributes of this group are 
themselves socially constructed as opposed to inherent or innate.103 
 
Although this political strategy recognizes the socially constructed 
nature of identity categories, by utilizing strategic essentialism, one 
misses the critical opportunity to destabilize the totalized, fixed, and 
immutable understandings of sex, gender and sexuality, as well as 
their relationships to one another. While strategic essentialism has 
been a useful tool in the achievement of basic human rights 
protections in Canadian law, we must begin to embrace the 
opportunities for creative discursive interventions that resist the 
normalizing thrust of categorization. 
 
Unfortunately, the common strategy among non-monogamous 
groups has been to disassociate and distance themselves from each 
other as a means to counter perceived assumptions that they are all 
the same.104 For example, many who identify as being polyamorous 
are quick to draw a line between polyamory and more casual sexual 
relationships—such as swinging—as a mean of situating emotionally 
based relationships as superior to other relationships based solely on 
sex.105 However, the move to essentialize polyamory as a relationship 
structure based on love and not sex, merely assimilates polyamory 
into model mono-normative values where notions of “love” are 
central to relationships. As Christian Klesse argues, a “love- and 
intimacy-centered discourse of polyamory can be presented as being 
superior to other forms of non-monogamy that emphasize more 
strongly the pursuit of sexual pleasure.”106 Such hierarchies are in 
danger of reinforcing mono-normative relational ideologies and 
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limiting the more sex radical politics of non-monogamy that some 
critics have championed.107 Instead of using discrete and exclusive 
categories to resist discrimination, a deconstructive legal strategy 
that resists the framing of relationships as essentialized categories 
may help to bolster queer theory’s broader insurgent project: one 
aimed at freeing sexuality from categorical identity constraints and 
from law’s regulative project.108 
 
4. A Queer Critique on Litigating for Change Under the 
Charter 
 
In Canada, the categorical approach to anti-discrimination law 
depends upon binaries that necessarily privilege one identity 
resulting in subordination of the other.109 It is within this concept that 
polygamous activists must be cautious in arguing for change under 
the Charter. A challenge to section 293 of the Criminal Code (as we 
have seen in Reference re: Criminal Code of Canada (B.C.)) and the 
civil definition of marriage may be brought under the Charter’s 
section 15 equality guarantee, the section 7 liberty guarantee or the 
section 2(a) right to freedom of religion. It may seem desirable to 
approach the subordination of non-monogamies through section 15 
of the Charter, as it is the predominant legal tool in which to address 
state discrimination. However, because the section 15 analysis turns 
on a categorical approach to discrimination, it becomes difficult to 
align queer theory with a section 15 Charter challenge.  
As was developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, when asserting a 
section 15 Charter challenge, the claimant must draw an analogy 
between the enumerated ground and the unenumerated ground based 
on historical or social disadvantage due to discriminatory treatment, 
which has been suffered by individuals as a consequence of 
membership in the group.110 This focus on categories of 
discrimination has led to much criticism. A general concern raised is 
that categories can become naturalized and essentialized and as a 
result the list of enumerated categories may appear historically and 
socially fixed.111 As Nitya Iyer has argued, this approach to anti-
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discrimination law fails to acknowledge that social identities are 
geographically and historically contingent.112 Moreover, the existence 
of a series of categories masks the “invisible background norm”.113 
Each category becomes a distinction from the norm, for which 
protection is appropriate while the norm remains in place, 
permanently fixed, immutable, and “undeconstructed”.114   
 
The essentialist/immutability model and the categorical approach 
that it accompanies are highly problematic from the perspective of 
queer theory. The categorical approach constrains the challenge 
posed by queer activists to the coherence and stability of identity 
categories and disguises the role of relations of oppression in their 
construction and maintenance.115 Thus, arguing that either the 
Criminal Code prohibition or the definition of marriage in the Civil 
Marriage Act discriminates against polygamists under section 15 
requires polygamy to be assigned a fixed identity, distinct from other 
relationship forms. Monogamy, in turn, would remain the 
undeconstructed norm. As a result, this approach would do nothing 
to question and deconstruct sexual, relational and familial identity 
categories. 
 
Further, in litigating for change under section 15 of the Charter, a 
claimant must fit his/her experience into a ground of 
discrimination-—a process that may be difficult for many claimants 
to do.116 Douglas Kropp argues that the Canadian courts’ use of the 
“enumerated or analogous grounds” approach, with its reliance on 
neat, tidy and rigidly demarcated categories to define the rights-
bearing subject, ensures that those persons who are unable to 
categorize or caricaturize themselves according to one of the 
enumerated categories find themselves “falling through the cracks” 
of Canadian equality and anti-discrimination law.117 This approach 
raises two concerns: (1) it demands that differences in terms of 
disadvantage and social location between individuals who share 
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membership in the same group are overlooked in the course of 
articulating the shared disadvantage;118 and (2) the focus on 
immutability demands that categories—both enumerated and 
analogous—be based on “personal characteristics” that are stable, 
fixed and not a matter of choice. Queer theory, in part, is about a 
logic of identity that is far more complex than just gender or 
sexuality, but instead recognizes that dimensions such as race, 
ethnicity, and religion all combine to constitute a person’s identity. 
Therefore, to reduce a discrimination claim to sexual orientation or 
family status—both grounds that polygamists might rely on under 
section 15—would overlook important aspects of a person’s identity 
as well as other factors that may have contributed to the 
discrimination faced by polygamists. 
 
Moreover, there is a concern that individuals who experience 
discrimination based on their involvement in a polygamous union 
may be unable to describe that experience as being based on an 
enumerated or analogous ground. Although parallels have been 
drawn between polygamy and same-sex marriage, in that they both 
involve challenges to the traditional definition of marriage, sexual 
orientation has been recognized as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination because it is an inherent aspect of a person’s 
identity.119 In contrast, many view polygamy as a particular type of 
chosen behaviour. Although the CPAA asserts that “conjugal 
polyamory is not just an outward practice but an inward component 
of the self of those who engage in it,”120 the argument that it may not 
be an immutable characteristic could preclude a successful claim. In 
general, the test of immutability contradicts queer theory by 
underscoring a view of so-called personal characteristics as essential, 
neutral, and historically continuous rather than as historically 
specific, culturally changeable, and the outcome of a “particular 
pattern of social relations” based upon oppression.121 
 
Although section 15 of the Charter relies to a great extent on the 
categorization of discrimination, it could be argued that pursuing 
change to the legal status of polygamy under sections 7 or 2(a) of the 
Charter aligns itself with queer theory. Due to the fact that this paper 
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121 Sychin, supra note 56 at para 15.  
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wishes to break the stereotype that polygamy is only a religious 
practice (found predominantly in the Mormon and Muslim faiths), I 
will not address a section 2(a) freedom of religion, claim. However, 
in retaining a queer perspective of sexuality and relationships, a 
challenge under section 7 of the Charter may be a progressive means 
of moving forward. In being denied the right to live in polygamous 
relationships without criminal prosecution and the right to formally 
enter marriage with more than one person, polygamists might be able 
to argue that their right to “liberty and security of the person” has 
been breached. Moreover, as was argued by the amicus curiae in 
Reference re: Criminal Code of Canada (B.C.), by banning 
polygamy, section 293 of the Criminal Code deprives polygamists of 
the freedom to make fundamentally and inherently personal choices 
with respect to their intimate relationships, and so implicates basic 
choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity 
and independence.122 Both the threat of imprisonment and the 
curtailment of a fundamentally personal choice constitute 
deprivations of liberty for the purposes of section 7.123 In contrast to a 
section 15 challenge, a challenge to anti-polygamy laws under 
section 7 would retain the idea that sexuality and relationships are 
fluid and can encompass a plurality of forms. In denying a person the 
right to chose for themselves how their personal relationships can 
best meet their needs, both the criminal law and marriage law have 
denied these individuals their right to liberty as is guaranteed under 
the Charter.  
 
However, like section 15, there are also problems associated with 
litigating for change under section 7. Some have argued that the view 
of marriage as simply a personal choice is wholly inadequate to 
evaluate the strategy of pursuing legal marriage because it neglects 
marriage’s legal and cultural consequences on others, such as those 
who resist marriage or those who are drawn to it for a mix of 
reasoning not of their own making.124 Indeed, presenting marriage as 
an unconstrained individual option requires us to forget it is a social 
system of both permission and restriction.125 In arguing for change, it 
must be borne in mind that marriage is not simply a choice that can 
be exercised privately without costs to others. In providing 
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legitimacy to a range of relationship structures, attention must be 
called to the ways in which relationships are constructed in society 
and the repercussions of state regulation. Therefore, whatever legal 
strategy is pursued, any argument for plural marriage requires a 
concern about how that strategy defines relationships and the effect 
of that strategy upon the pursuit of a plurality of sexed and gendered 
practices. 
 
Part IV: Going Forward: Pluralizing Marital and Familial 
Forms 
 
The discussion thus far has attempted to broaden the current 
polygamy debate that is ongoing in the British Columbia courts. I 
have argued, first, that the ideal of monogamous marriage is a 
socially and politically constructed institution, perpetuated in 
Western societies through cultural stereotypes and dominant 
discourse. Second, I have shown that by deconstructing and 
questioning the boundaries and identity categories of intimate 
relationships, we can begin to appreciate a plurality of sexual 
practices and identities and empower those who do not fit into the 
mono-norm. 
 
How, then, should the law respond to this queer perspective on 
intimate relationships? The first obvious step would be to remove the 
criminal law’s regulating power over intimate relationships. The 
utility of section 293 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the entry 
into “any form of polygamy” or live in “any kind of conjugal union 
with more than one person at the same time”, is thought to protect 
women and children from evils such as child abuse, domestic 
violence, and forced or underage marriage—all of which are already 
prohibited under other laws in Canada.126 As a law solely based on 
racists and political motivations, section 293 of the Criminal Code 
merely perpetuates the mono-normative perspective of monogamy as 
an essential foundation of personal relationships and the natural 
pattern of living together. From this perspective, polygamy, as well 
as other relationships which do not represent this pattern, are 
demonized, pathologized, marginalized, and subject to the criminal 
law’s punitive power. Only through the decriminalization of 
polygamy will Canada begin to recognize the value in non-
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monogamous relationships. Further, beyond section 293, we must 
begin to consider other status-discriminatory regulations for 
sexuality. Although this paper has focused on polygamy, we must 
question the criminal law’s regulatory hold over all forms of sexual 
practices and intimacies. Although some legal restrictions are likely 
legitimate due to their aims of protecting individuals from harm, 
other provisions, like the prohibition against polygamy, may simply 
be a means of perpetuating hegemonic norms. 
 
Secondly, people engaging in non-monogamous relationships are 
often unable to claim the relationship rights gained by monogamous 
couples. It is therefore suggested that we begin to question Canada’s 
conception of what marriage is and who is legally able to participate 
in marital unions. From the viewpoint of liberal theory, the state 
should remain neutral with respect to competing conceptions of what 
marriage is and of how individuals’ needs for sex and emotional 
intimacy, material support in daily life, reproduction and childrearing 
are to be met.127 The state fails to be neutral when it chooses one 
particular form of relationship to support.128 We must question the 
desirability of defining a single form of state marriage. With the 
multiplicity of care-giving and familial structures in Canada, the 
notion that relationship rights and marriage should be limited to 
dyadic, conjugal unions is an archaic assumption that is out of touch 
with the reality of life in Canada. Thus, Canada would do better to 
move toward a more pluralistic conception of personal relationships, 
and it might do so in one of two ways. As suggested by Cheshire 
Calhoun, “we might adopt a fully contractual approach to emotional, 
sexual, childrearing, and adult support relationships. In that case, the 
state would simply enforce the terms of the contracts agreed upon by 
the contracting parties.”129 Alternatively, we can retain the institution 
of marriage, but expand it to include a plurality of marriage or 
relational options rather than a single state-sanctioned form of 
marriage. Due to the symbolic importance of marriage in Canada for 
both the dominant majority and those who identify more with 
subjugated groups, arguably the retention and expansion of marriage 
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would be the preferred option. While this approach may be 
questioned due to the de-legitimating and invalidating nature of 
marriage, an expansion of marriage could be seen as a step towards 
the larger goal of breaking down the privileging, regulatory manner 




In the first post-Charter case to deal with the issue of same-sex 
marriage, Layland v Ontario, Justice Greer, in dissent, stated: “It is a 
basic theory in our society that the state will respect choices made by 
individuals and the state will avoid subordinating these choices to 
any one conception.”130 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of 
Canada ultimately adopted this position with respect to same-sex 
marriage, Canada continues to assert the belief that marriage can 
only take place between two people to the exclusion of all others. 
Not only does our law fail to recognize plural marriage; it actually 
penalizes individuals who enter into any kind of conjugal union with 
more than one person at the same time. In taking this stance, the law 
has over-generalized and stereotyped an intimate relationship 
structure as being inherently gender discriminatory and harmful to 
women and children. Instead of accepting the diverse reality of 
intimate relationships, our legal system has situated monogamy as 
the only valid way of relating. 
 
The Supreme Court of British Columbia is finally faced with the 
important opportunity to address this discrimination.131 Instead of 
focusing on the polygyny practiced in Bountiful, BC, in giving 
respect to all forms of plural unions, the Court must acknowledge 
that polygamy can be practiced in a way that promotes equality, 
dignity and love. For too long the monogamy bias has been accepted 
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in Western society without question. For the most part, we have 
ignored the manner in which monogamous marriage privileges, 
excludes, and provides the vehicle in which the state can regulate 
intimate relationships. The deconstruction and questioning of this 
social institution will hopefully provide opportunities for resistance 
against mono-normativity and stimulate a discourse wherein intimate 
relationships can be viewed as fluid instead of categorical and 
exclusive. 
 
Marriage continues to be an important institution in Canada and 
abroad. Despite the fact that it has been used as a tool to privilege the 
dominant class and exclude people that might be considered as 
“other,” entry into it carries with it the symbolic power to transform 
community and culture. Through the queering of the 
monogamy/polygamy divide, an important opportunity emerges in 
which we can collapse the boundaries of sexuality, expose 
relationships as fluid, and pluralize sexed and gendered practices.  
Therefore, decriminalizing polygamy and expanding marriage to 
include a plurality of relationship forms would be an important step 
in breaking the monogamy bias. Although the idea of marriage itself 
and the state’s continued regulatory hold over intimate relationships 
are essentially antithetical to queer theory, a deconstructive legal 
strategy which aims to break down the categorical, exclusionary 
nature of marriage may help to bolster queer theory’s broader 
insurgent project to free sexuality from categorical identity 
constraints and open up a legitimate range of sexual, gendered and 
relational possibilities.  
 
